

CREDIT STACKING IN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS:WATER QUALITY AND CARBON MARKETS




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2013




CREDIT STACKING IN AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS:WATER QUALITY AND CARBON
MARKETS

Nonpoint Source Pollution - Visual Description



Nonpoint Source Pollution - Visual Description



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Abatement Actions: Reduced (no) Tillage

No till and corn



[http://www.pickawayswd.org/pictures/No %20Till %20&%20Strip %20Till/corn_no_till.jpg](http://www.pickawayswd.org/pictures/No%20Till%20&%20Strip%20Till/corn_no_till.jpg)

No till and soybean



http://library.farmprogress.com/AL0812P73-web-images08121746A_fmt.jpeg

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Abatement Actions: Cover Crops

Cover crops: winter rye



Cover crops: winter rye, no till



http://nowlearningfarms.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/cover_crop_com_residue.jpg

http://www.sustainablecom.org/in_Field_Management/img/rye2.JPG

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Land Retirement

Gammagrass-big blue stem planting



http://www.fsa.usda.gov/Internet/FSA_image/ia_767_15.jpg



http://www.iowadnr.gov/Portals/dnr/uploads/Wildlife%20Stewardship/crp_prairie.jpg

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Goal

- Analyze the impact of the existence of a carbon offset market on the efficiency of a water quality trading program for non-point sources:
 - the water quality trading program is a local cap and trade program (i.e., at the watershed or state level).
 - the carbon market is a wider market (i.e., nationwide) with no specific cap requirements at farm level.

Goal

A point-based trading program for non-point sources

- Assign each abatement practice a point value, based on its effectiveness in reducing edge-of-field emissions
- Each farmer required to hold points per acre to satisfy the target requirement
- Farmers can buy/sell point with each
- Can have trading ratios, allow new practices once proven, etc.

Rabotyagov, S., Valou, A., Kling, C.L. 2013. "Reversing the Property Rights: Practice-Based Approaches for Controlling Agricultural Nonpoint-Source Water Pollution When Emissions Aggregate Nonlinearly," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, forthcoming.

Valou, A. 2013. "Nonpoint source pollution and water quality trading under imperfect cost information and measurement errors," dissertation.

A point-based trading program for non-point sources

Assigning the Point Values

1. Linear approximation of the water quality production function:

$$A^e(X) \cong \sum_{field} d_{field}^e r_{field}(x) \quad e = N \text{ or } P$$

$$d_f^e r_f(x) \cong \sum_{practice} a_{field,practice}^e x_{field,practice}$$

Use simulation model to generate approximation via ols

2. BUT, could use expert opinion, or other methods

Assigning the Point Values

- **Simulate the outcomes of a point-based trading market**

$$\min_{x_{ij}, b_i} \sum_i \{ \sum_j c_{ij} x_{ij} + p b_i \} s_i \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i \{ \sum_j^J a_{ij} x_{ij} + b_i \} s_i \geq \sum_i b_i^o s_i$$

where:

$x_{ij} \in \{0, 1\}$ the abatement action j for field

a_{ij} the number of points associated with the abatement action j

b_i^o point requirement

b_i points held

s_i area of field

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- Simulate the outcomes of a point-based trading market for water quality in the presence of a market for carbon offsets:

$$\min_{x_{ij}, b_i} \sum_i \{ \sum_j c_{ij} x_{ij} - p_c g_j(x_{ij}) x_{ij} + p b_i \} s_i \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \sum_i \{ \sum_j^J a_{ij} x_{ij} + b_i \} s_i \geq \sum_i b_i^0 s_i$$

p_c is price of a carbon offset


$g_j(x_{ij})$ represents the amount of soil carbon sequestration associated with abatement action j and field

- Compare the outcomes of the two trading settings.

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Data


- Boone River Watershed
- Soil Carbon sequestration simulated by EPIC
- Point-based trading markets for N and P
- Price of carbon \$5, \$15, \$25 per eMtCO₂



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Boone River Watershed

- ~0.53 million acres
- tile drained, 90% corn and soybeans
- some of the highest nitrogen loads in Iowa
- 30 subbasins; 2,900 field units



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Abatement Actions

Abatement action	Abatement action description
Baseline	No action required
No till (NT)	No till, no more than 30 % of crop residue is removed
Reduced Fertilizer (RF)	Reducing fertilizer application rate by 20 %.
Cover Crops (CC)	Establishment of cover crops between crop rotations.
Land retirement (CRP)	Retirement of land from production
NT, RF	No till and 20 % reduction in nitrogen application rate
NT, RF	No till, no more than 30 % of crop residue is removed
RF, CC	Reduced fertilizer and establishment of cover crops.
NT, RF, CC	No till, 20 % reduction in nitrogen application rate and cover crops

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Data

Abatement Action	Point Values (kg/acre)		Carbon Sequestration, eMtCO ₂ /acre
	Nitrogen	Phosphorus	
No action	0	0	0.00
No till	2.35	0.17	0.28
Cover Crops	2.42	0.11	0.25
No till, Cover Crops	4.26	0.16	0.79
Red.Fert	0.62	0	0.00
Red.Fert,No till	2.98	0.17	0.22
Red.Fert, Cover Crops	2.95	0.11	0.19
Red.Fert,No till, Cover Crops	4.79	0.17	0.72
Land retirement	7.32	0.29	0.52

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30% Phosphorus and Carbon Offsets

	Carbon market			
	\$0	\$5	\$15	\$25
	% Gains		% Gains	
Carbon Sequestration	68,905 (eMtCo2)	8	54	132
Cost savings for farmers to the trading program	\$857,851	42	144	303
Additional total abatement costs	---	2	47	178


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30% N Water quality and Carbon Offsets

	No carbon Market	Carbon market		
	\$0	\$5	\$15	\$25
		% Gains	% Gains	% Gains
Total Carbon Sequestration	135,833 (eMtCo2)	9	26	40
Cost savings for farmers to the trading program	2,515,932	28	92	166
Additional total abatement costs	---	1	11	28


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Land use competition: water quality vs. carbon benefits : 30 % N abatement goal




Land use competition: water quality vs. carbon benefits : 30 % N abatement goal

Land use competition: water quality vs. carbon benefits : 30% P abatement goal



Land use competition: water quality vs. carbon benefits : 30% P abatement goal


Land use: the change in the distribution of the abatement actions



The distribution of the abatement actions 30% N abatement goal

Land use: the change in the distribution of the abatement actions

Final Comments

- At relatively modest carbon prices, the total program costs become negative, meaning that farmers obtain extra revenue by selling carbon offsets
- While the program cost is reduced, since more expensive abatement actions are adopted, the total cost of implementing the abatement actions increases.
- Loads of appreciation to the USDA ERS cooperative  that made this possible

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