

**Spatial Management  
of Invasive Alien Species**  
*An Application to Cheatgrass  
Management in the Great Basin*

James Sanchirico, *UC Davis and RFF*  
**Carolyn Fischer** and Conrad Coleman, *RFF*  
H.J. Albers, *Oregon State University*

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# Motivation

- IS management is a complex problem with many dimensions
  - Evaluating options requires understanding not only these features but how they interact
  - Previous literature has focused on other combinations; we focus on the spatial aspects.
- *Biological*
  - *Economic*
  - *Spatial*
  - *Intertemporal*
  - *Stochastic*

# Two Spatial Models

- Model 1: Transmission Pathways and Policy Options
- Model 2: Native rangeland and invasive weeds

# Key Research Questions

- What are the crucial feedbacks that influence the relative effectiveness of IS policies?
  - “Spatial Management of Invasive Ecosystem Engineers”
- What if the scope of IS policies does not match the ecosystem/economic scale of the problem?
  - “Invasive Species Management in a Spatially Heterogeneous World: Spatial vs. Uniform Policies”
- How does spatial connectivity, including fire hazards, affect cheatgrass management?
  - “Sagebrush vs. Cheatgrass in the Great Basin”


# Transmission Pathways

- IS can enter a local ecosystem in several ways
- Economic
  - “Foreign” trade: transportation and commerce from outside the larger system (e.g., foreign container ships)
  - “Domestic” trade: transportation and commerce between two patches (e.g., inland river, air, and road travel)
- Ecological
  - Natural dispersal of the invasive species (e.g., currents, fish, birds)
  - Fire risk

# Policy Options

- Reduce likelihood of entry by inspections, quarantines, and reducing the volume of trade
- Prevent long-term establishment and spread with better land or water management practices and/or mitigate damages by changing land use or grazing patterns
- Restore habitat for native species
- Remove or eradicate existing infestations, including use of biological controls
- Physical barriers to fire dispersal (in 3<sup>rd</sup> paper)
- *How much and where?*

# Stylized Description of Model 1



# Ecological Features of the Model: Invasive species

- Probability of invasive taking hold depends on
  - Transmission pathways and magnitudes
  - Level of inspections of trade going into each patch (greater inspections lower probability)
  - Stock of invasives in source patch
  - Quality of the habitat in the patch (impedes entry)
- IS growth depends on
  - Quality of the habitat in the patch (impedes growth)
  - Natural growth rate
  - Removal efforts (directly decreases invasive stock)

# Ecological Features of the Model: Habitat

- Habitat quality (stock variable) improves with
  - Natural regeneration
  - Investments in restoration
- Habitat is damaged/depleted by
  - Agricultural (non-habitat) inputs
  - Increase in invasive population



# Economic features of the model

- Agricultural production depends on
  - Habitat quality and ecosystem services from the habitat
  - Use of non-habitat inputs
- Social planner maximizes agricultural revenues net of input costs, and net of policy costs of inspections, removal, and remediation
  - Dynamic model; we focus on steady states

# Numerical Analysis

- We investigate the spatial aspects of the invasive species problem from two angles.
  - How do the patch-specific controls change when new transmission (spatial) pathways are introduced?
  - How do aspatial (uniform) policies differ from their spatial counterparts, and how are they affected when new pathways are introduced?
- Stylized example

# Spatial homogeneity, spatial processes, and control problems

Percentage change from no connectivity steady state  
(symmetric case)

	Either Patch				
	Invasive	Removal	Restoration	Commodity Input use	Commodity Output
Ecol. Disp.	1.77	5.82	-0.69	-1.30	-.62
Dom. Trade	-.20	.92	-.17	-0.22	-.31
Foreign Trade	387.39	16.32	42.30	8.79	2.83
Dom. & For.	392.40	17.15	42.77	8.78	2.83
Disp., Dom. & For.	403.26	21.83	43.60	8.26	2.83

# Adding Asymmetries

- Port-Inland Case: No exogenous flows from outside the system into the inland patch
- Cost of agricultural inputs are cheaper in the inland patch, all else equal
- Both

# Sensitivity to relative cost of non-habitat input (full connectivity)

Invasive



Habitat

Input use

Removal

Restore

Trade



# Sensitivity to spatial linkage

- Percentage change from the case with no linkages that is due to the connectivity in the model.
- A positive (negative) level implies that the case with the linkages is changing faster (slower) than the case without the linkages.

$j$  is the parameter set over which the sensitivity analysis is run,

$o$  is symmetric case

$k$  is model run



$K$  is model run w/ no linkages

Percent change due to spatial linkage



$$=100 * \left( \frac{\frac{Y(j,k)}{Y(o,k)} - \frac{Y(j,K)}{Y(o,K)}}{\frac{Y(j,K)}{Y(o,K)}} \right)$$

# Sensitivity to relative input costs

Removal  
Effort





Restoration  
Effort





# Sensitivity to relative removal costs

Removal  
Effort




Restoration  
Effort



# Spatial Discussion

- Foreign trade's impact appears larger than other pathways
- Control strategies are not simply additive or average combinations of the results with a limited set of pathways because system-wide interactions are non-linear.
  - policy recommendations from modeling efforts that only consider one of the dimensions and/or control strategies may be far from efficient.
- Control strategies interact in a non-linear way with the degree of spatial heterogeneity.


# Spatial Policies vs. Uniform Ones



**Figure 9 Steady-state controls at the spatial and uniform optimal**

**Note: Domestic inspection levels are divided by ten for expositional reasons.**

# Policy Expenditure Shares: Sensitivity to relative IS growth rates



Spatial: ●●● & Uniform: ○○○

# Uniform Discussion

- Policy levels reflect some averaging of the spatially optimal strategies.
- Policy mixes—and their responses to additional asymmetries across space—can differ substantially.
- Net effect on welfare seems small
  - shift from the agricultural sector (lower profits) to government stakeholders (lower IS policy expenditures)


# Application to Cheatgrass in the Great Basin

- Over 40 million hectares of rangelands suffer loss of perennial native vegetation, grazing and watershed values, habitat, and aesthetics
- Invaded where native plants did not evolve with significant grazing pressure
- Less nutritional content for cattle




# Cheatgrass and Fire

- Shortened and intensified wildfire cycle, as cheatgrass grows earlier and loses moisture content earlier.
- Cheatgrass has increased success rate against native species following wildfires, creating positive feedback loop and preventing recovery





# Sagebrush-grassland ecosystem with cheatgrass





# With Connectivity

# No Connectivity




No Grazing



Low Grazing



High Grazing



sagebrush

cheatgrass

# Cheatgrass Discussion

- Spatial component matters
  - frequency with which one might predict the system to switch to a cheatgrass-dominated landscape increases.
- Lower grazing rates in the interior patches relative to the outer edges to reduce the spatial externality.
- Greenstripping reduces spatial externalities, increasing the level of grazing within each patch

# Acknowledgements

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# Future work

- Consider decentralized commodity production decisions
- Consider (2) separate regional planners that might or might not cooperate

# Thanks!

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